Europe losing influence in climate negotiations

With ten months to go before the COP 21, Paris is doing all it can to provide the ideal conditions for a global agreement. Europe hopes to play a facilitating role in the international negotiations, which will focus on the needs and attainable contributions of individual countries.

The countdown to Paris has begun. The clock on the new Paris 2015 website ticks off the days, while the feeling of excitement and expectation among the event’s organisers is palpable. The Paris climate conference kicks off in 308 days, and should it fail, it could be the last of its kind.

For France, this is simply not an option. “In this conference, the French are playing the jolly Club Med entertainers! They are not too concerned with detail, they just want the atmosphere to be right,” a source close to the conference told EurActiv.fr. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Laurent Fabius, has already dedicated a year’s work to paving the way for a successful conference, and the EU is also playing its part.

Still no consensus on method

But so far, progress has been minimal, and largely related to the mechanics of a future agreement. This was discussed at length during the Lima conference in December 2014, and will be a pivotal issue in forming a consensus. Our source said “for everyone to agree, we first have to be speaking the same language, and that is what is missing today”.

The type of objectives, the methods used to achieve them, the periods of commitment and the evaluation of results are all subjects of endless debate.

The shadow of a framework was defined in Lima, and the final text from the December conference suggested that the participants submit their positions for Paris by May 2015. This is standard practice for negotiations whose aim is to arrive at a legally binding agreement; a “classic” international treaty like the Kyoto Protocol. But the nature of national contributions remains ill-defined, and the differentiation between states unclear. The old classifications of Annexes 1 and 2 have been scrapped to make way for a more complex arrangement, with many possible divergences.

“Bottom-up” approach

The new agreement will take a “bottom-up” approach, consisting of many bilateral agreements, which it is hoped will have a greater impact on reducing CO₂ emissions than the “top-down” framework of Kyoto, whereby the required reductions were evaluated on a global scale before being portioned out to individual states.

The USA-China agreement, signed last November, is a prime example of this new approach. It represents a leap forward in the fight against climate change, and comes outside of any conventional framework. The flip side is that this kind of extra-UN declaration is that it can cause unhelpful friction at the Conference of the Parties.

Stefan Aykut, a researcher and co-author of the book Governing the climate? Twenty years of international negotiations, wrote that “India felt excluded from the process after this agreement between

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the major emitters, and played a part in blocking the Lima negotiations. Which came to nothing in the end”.

Europe to host, but not lead

The changing geopolitical landscape lies at the heart of the problem for Europe. The EU is no longer the driving force behind the global fight against climate change, in part because the 28 country bloc’s carbon footprint is now relatively light compared to that of the worst-emitting emerging economies and the United States, and in part because the “top-down” approach it advocates, and continues to apply within its own borders, has fallen from favour.

Europe’s climate alliance with developing countries, which benefited from payments under the Clean Development Mechanism, collapsed along with the price of carbon. At €7 per ton, these projects are no longer sustainable, leaving the future funding of the fight against climate change under a cloud of uncertainty.

Agreement with room for improvement

The negotiations are further complicated by the fact that the objective of limiting global warming to +2°C by 2050 appears to be getting further and further out of reach. This has been the official objective of the international climate negotiations since 2009, but if climate change continues on its current trajectory, we are likely to see temperature rises of between +4°C and +6°C by the end of the century. The economist and UN advisor Jeffrey D. Sachs wrote that “to stay below the two-degree limit, the world’s governments must embrace a core concept: “deep decarbonisation” of the world’s energy system.”

Stefan Aykut sees what he describes as a “schism” of realities: “on the one hand the scientists are raising the alarm over the pressing need to eliminate CO₂ emissions immediately, in order to avoid rapid global warming, and on the other hand the negotiation process is going ahead at an unbelievably slow rate”. Should we ignore this paradox and continue step by step, regardless? Or should we risk the diplomatic backlash and try to whip the more reticent parties into action? This is what is at stake in the next 308 days.

Carbon pricing: a challenge for the future

The concept of carbon pricing as a tool to combat climate change is broadly accepted by the international community. But at what price, and under what conditions? As the world looks for ways to cut CO₂ emissions, many questions remain unanswered.

At the World Economic Forum in Davos last week, François Hollande, Ban Ki-moon and Jim Yong Kim, the president of the World Bank, all stressed the importance of placing a price on carbon.

Many of the methods used to tackle climate change have evolved in recent years, even though a growing consensus has emerged around the pricing of greenhouse gas emissions.

But opinion is divided over how pricing systems should be implemented. Emille Alberola, an economist in charge of carbon market research for CDC Climat, said “A real consensus emerged over the price of carbon at the UN summit in New-York in September, but there were no calls to establish carbon markets”.

The difficult beginnings of the first carbon market

The reputation of carbon markets has suffered in recent years. Headlines were made at the COP 20 in Lima, when indigenous tribes appealed to the United Nations conference not to develop carbon markets for fear that they would encourage land speculation. In Europe a lack of credibility is the major issue.

The European emissions trading system (ETS) has weathered many storms, including massive VAT fraud, quota thefts, various scams like Ponzi schemes, and criticism from environmentalists. It is also in direct competition with other EU energy policies, such as the large-scale subsidising...
of renewable energies. Renewables are responsible for over half the EU’s reduction of CO2 emissions since 2008.

Though the aim of the ETS is clearly being achieved, with greenhouse gas emissions falling, the precise achievements of the carbon market are harder to pin down.

Despite this lack of clarity, the carbon market has its supporters.

Emilie Alberola said, “The carbon market has not reached the end of its shelf-life. It represents a way of defining an explicit [carbon] price, whether in the form of a quota or a tax. The alternative is to bring about an implicit price through the introduction of new standards. In any case, we must recognise that neither system is totally efficient”.

Majority support

The concept of carbon markets enjoys the broad support of the international community. Its increasing introduction by governments around the world illustrates their political acceptability as a method of taxation. China has established no fewer than six carbon markets, South Korea has recently launched its first, and the United States has two major markets, one on the east coast and one on the west.

Certain European countries, including the United Kingdom and Sweden, believe in carbon pricing so thoroughly that they have implemented parallel carbon taxes.

EU reform under way

Juliette de Grandpré, a climate and energy expert at WWF Germany, said “Reform takes time, it’s true. But the latest developments are encouraging. In the European Parliament even the Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) Committee is not opposed to the scheduled reduction of the quotas on offer”.

On 22 January, the ITRE Committee failed to adopt a common position on carbon market reform. German European People’s Party members voted with the Greens and the Socialists and Democrats to speed up progress on the newly proposed Market Stability Reserve. The reserve would see carbon quotas withdrawn from the market in order to increase the price of CO2 emissions.

The European Parliament Environment (ENVI) Committee will decide in February whether to begin withdrawing quotas from the market in 2017, four years ahead of the current schedule.

The future model of carbon quota allocation will be more delicately managed than the current model. Since becoming operational in 2005, the ETS has systematically over-allocated carbon quotas.

Private sector to the rescue?

Private initiatives are also part of the range of tools being considered for the job of fixing a price on carbon emissions. Emilie Alberola said, “It is possible that businesses will address the issue themselves[...] those that bet on and invest in a decarbonised model could see returns in the long term”.

In the absence of clear regulation, this is a bet that some companies are already willing to take. 73 states and 1,000 companies (including Unilever and Philips) are already participating in a scheme organised by the World Bank, that aims to put a firm price on the carbon they emit.

Laurence Tubiana: ‘EU-China climate agreement is conceivable’

Climate change specialist Laurence Tubiana is the negotiator representing France at the 2015 Paris Climate Conference. She took the time to share her views on of the discussions between the world’s biggest CO2 emitters with EurActiv France.

At the COP 20 in Lima, we saw negotiators with many contrasting positions. What is the priority today as we move towards an agreement in Paris at the end of the year?

The American and Anglo-Saxon media have been much more positive than the French media in their coverage of the Lima COP. We knew we were not going to obtain concrete commitments from all the countries, because that was not the aim of this conference. Questions remain over the key points of the agreement. Particularly over its legal nature: will it be binding or not? This question is still open. The nature of commitments and the differentiation between developed countries and developing countries is also problematic. Is it possible for all countries to make the same level of commitments, and have their progress judged against the same criteria? The question of financing must also be resolved.

But Lima demonstrated the good will of the participants, and resulted in a joint text.
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We also made progress on the “Lima Paris Action Agenda,” which will help mobilise the non-governmental participants. So I think the outcome of the Lima COP was positive, even if we still have lots of work to do.

China and the United States announced a bilateral agreement on climate questions in November. Do you see these bilateral negotiations as an asset or an obstacle for an international agreement?

This announcement was very positive, and very important for the negotiation process: the two largest emitters committing to reduce their emissions, it’s simply remarkable. It is important to understand that climate negotiations do not work like other international negotiations. In the end, all the CO₂ emissions add together, whatever happens, so anything that can be done to limit them contributes to the same goal, there is no competition. Bilateral agreements are welcome; we could also conceive of one between Europe and China, for example. This way of negotiating brings concrete progress. Certain parts of the USA-China agreement were even included in the final text from Lima; they are part of the process.

The EU is negotiating on behalf of a bloc of countries with potentially divergent positions. Germany is pushing for a more ambitious agreement, and France wants above all to make sure the agreement gets signed. How do we reconcile these positions?

This is a well-oiled process in the EU. The negotiation will be led by the presidency of the European Council, which will be occupied by Luxembourg at the end of the year during the COP 21. Negotiations will also take place in meetings between EU Foreign Affairs ministers. Germany has always shown a great deal of ambition in climate issues, and such strong views are important, but I am not worried about reaching a consensus. Europeans have a lot of experience in this area. What is important is the 2030 objective, which was fixed last autumn, well in advance of the Paris conference, and welcomed by many of the participants in the climate negotiations.

At the recent Davos economic forum, and at others in the past, many leaders called for a price to be assigned to carbon. But is this anything more than an empty slogan?

The moment we abandon the idea of a global limit to CO₂ emissions, the idea behind the Kyoto Protocol, and start asking each country to commit to its own emissions-reduction programme, we can stop imagining a global CO₂ market with one fixed price for carbon. So it is true that the idea has been abandoned. But this is not to say that different carbon markets and tax systems cannot emerge all over the world, depending on the path each country follows. Some companies are even demanding that efforts be made to fix a price to carbon, so they can take it into account in their business plans.

What is the position of the OPEC countries (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) in this latest cycle of negotiations?

The biggest change is that Saudi Arabia is prepared to get involved in the negotiations, because it is no longer possible for a country to deny human-induced climate change. Of course, the economies of the oil-producing countries rely mainly on selling fossil fuels. It would be best for the climate if these hydrocarbons remained underground. This means the oil-producers will have to modify their economies, and that will not happen quickly. The idea is gaining ground, however, and these countries are also investing in the energy transition. Saudi Arabia has a CO₂ capture and storage system, for example. So the trend is very different compared to the last cycle of negotiations.

The decline of the price of oil to 50 dollars a barrel gives a negative signal to consumers. Is this a risk for a global agreement?

Lower oil prices could provide opportunities. The high energy bill contributed to the economic crisis in the West. It was a heavy constraint. Lower energy prices could provide financial manoeuvrability for greater investment in the energy transition, thanks to increased growth. So it is a good thing. Of course we could argue that lower oil prices will lead people to consume more of it. But I think people are increasingly aware of the impact of fossil fuels on the climate and are beginning to make their decisions accordingly.

We do not hear much from the climate sceptics. Have they disappeared?

It is becoming difficult to defend climate sceptic positions today. The attacks we may face will most likely be indirect; they will tackle the solutions we adopt. The sceptics will say our resources would be better spent in adapting to climate change than in trying to limit greenhouse gas emissions, for example. This essentially boils down to the same thing. But the real climate sceptics do not have much credibility.

Naomi Oreskes pointed out that the expert who refuted the link between human activity and climate disruption was the same scientist that dismantled the link between cigarettes and cancer for the tobacco industry several years ago... this is not taken seriously. In the United States, the Senate is still unconvinced. Al Gore told me that Senators have recently rejected a resolution specifying that global warming resulted from human activities. But the United States has a very unusual political system!
Climate negotiations reveal new alliances in the Global South

The economic divides between developing countries are widening. In order to defend their interests at the climate negotiations, large emerging economies, small island states and the less advanced countries are forming alliances based on common concerns.

The previously clear demarcation between North and South used in past climate negotiations is becoming blurred.

The 192 participant countries of the 21st UN Conference of the Parties (COP), taking place in Paris from 30 November to 11 December 2015, are organising themselves into different groups to promote their positions.

Traditionally, countries have been divided into two categories: developing countries were grouped together under “Annex 1” and developed countries, judged responsible for climate change to a greater extent, were grouped under “Annex 2”.

But it became clear at the COP 20 in Lima last December that the line between the two groups has become hazy.

The principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, established in the final text of the COP 20, allows for differences in expectations between developed and developing countries in terms of climate commitments, without resorting to the two strictly defined groups of the Kyoto Protocol.

A fragmented bloc

To achieve greater influence at UN negotiations, developing countries have formed an umbrella organisation called the G77.

Founded in 1964, it is the largest group of developing countries taking part in the climate negotiations. The G77 contains enormous variety, including the powerful emerging economies of Brazil and China, less advanced countries like Mali and Nepal and even members of the OECD, like Chili, Mexico and South Korea.

As a result, the group defends a broad patchwork of interests that are often far removed from those of the more developed countries. “We are talking about a certain number of countries with completely divergent economic interests. It is unrealistic to think these countries will remain on the same path,” Romain Bennicchio, Oxfam’s chief representative at the climate negotiations explained.

But with the promises of developed countries, and particularly the European Union, often failing to bear fruit, the South continues to seek strength in numbers.

At the Durban conference, an alliance emerged between the developed countries and the groups of the Least Developed Countries and Small Island States. But Louise van Schaik from the Climate and Development Knowledge Network believes that the lack of progress on climate finance threatens such cooperation in the future.

Differences between the members of these groups have led to the creation of more or less formalised sub-groups to defend certain interests.

In some cases this has given rise to surprising alliances, such as the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), which includes Liechtenstein, Monaco, South Korea, Switzerland and Mexico.

The Group of Like-Minded Developing Countries would appear to be an equally explosive mixture, bringing together Bolivia, China, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Mali, Sri Lanka and Saudi Arabia, among others.

Among the other subdivisions are certain geographical organisations including the African Group and the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC).

Other international configurations are organised around the economic or environmental situation; the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) is particularly susceptible to the effects of rising sea-levels and the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Group represents the most economically vulnerable.

Abundance of groups

This abundance of negotiating groups among developing countries is not just a sign of divergent interests in the Southern hemisphere. “Many subjects are negotiated within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). So it is difficult for the delegations to follow the whole of the negotiations and to put themselves in the best position to make proposals,” Romain Benicchio said.

The expertise of each group also reflects the variety of subjects being discussed.

The LDC group has increasingly imposed its views on the responsibilities of developed countries, while the IALAC countries have emerged as specialists in proposing solutions to the question of how to finance the fight against climate change.

“The Association Of Small Island States has a lot at stake in the question of how to deal with loss or damage when adaptation to climate change is no longer possible. They are often at the forefront of the debate,” Romain Benicchio said.
Climate finance eclipsed by fossil fuel subsidies

The successful conclusion of a global agreement at the Paris Climate Conference depends heavily on the mobilisation of finance for the fight against climate change. So far, international fundraising efforts have lacked intensity.

Climate change will cost us dearly. Estimates for the cost of reducing global greenhouse gas emissions to sustainable levels vary from 500 billion to 1,500 billion euros per year.

Less than a year ahead of the 2015 Conference of the Parties (COP) in Paris, where 194 countries will negotiate an agreement aimed at limiting global warming to +2°C from 2020, the finances set aside to cover the considerable costs are still inadequate. The situation is becoming more urgent by the day.

At the Copenhagen and Cancun conferences, developed countries promised to mobilise an annual sum of $100 billion (around €70 billion) in public and private finance by 2020.

Many developing depend heavily upon the delivery of this ambitious objective in order to fund their adaptation to climate change and limit their greenhouse gas emissions.

But in spite of initial efforts to capitalise on the Green Climate Fund, the tool that will eventually account for a large portion of the $100 billion, the sums needed are not forthcoming.

The Lima COP in December 2014 was followed by a flurry of contributions to the fund from developed countries including France, Germany, the UK and Japan, which totalled almost $10 billion (€7.4 billion).

Limitations of the CDM

The limitations of existing finance tools, like the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), are also becoming painfully evident.

The mechanism allows developed countries to fund “green” projects in poorer countries. Credits for each ton of CO₂ emissions saved through these projects in the global South are then released onto the carbon markets.

But the collapse of the carbon price has rendered the system impotent and left it redundant.

Many feel this is simply not good enough. Developing countries in the Global South need to be sure their northern counterparts will keep their promises, and the large industrialising nations, like China and India, are also refusing to loosen their purse strings until they receive certain guarantees.

Romain Benicchio from Oxfam France said “We first have to resolve the question of pre-2020 financing before looking at the post-2020 question.”

The conclusions adopted by the 194 participants at the Lima conference called on developed countries to provide increased financial support to the developing world, particularly the most vulnerable countries.

But Benicchio is doubtful: “The lack of financial commitments from developed countries is slowing down the negotiations. This will not be solved before Paris.”

The future of private finance

Private finance could play an important role in tackling climate change. The first initiatives have already been rolled out: in early 2013, a consortium of investment banks drew up a set of common standards for a green bond market and the French Development Agency (AFD) recently launched its first “green” bondholder programme.

But the accounting methods for these bonds remain vague. Private finance tools will be an important point of discussion at the 2015 Paris Climate Conference, and decisions will have to be made on how best to deploy them in wider climate finance efforts.

“The absence of strong political engagement on the subject is allowing investment in fossil fuels continue unchecked. The Oxfam report stresses that “$6 trillion will be spent on fossil fuel development and exploration in the next ten years.”
Jerzy Buzek: COP 20 ‘was no breakthrough’

Despite progress made, the UN climate conference in Lima last December did not produce any breakthrough, says Jerzy Buzek. Without the joint effort of developed and developing countries, it will be impossible to find an international agreement on climate change, he warns.

Jerzy Buzek is the Chairman of the European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). M. Buzek was President of the European Parliament between 2009 and 2012. He spoke to Karolina Zbytniewska, from EurActiv.pl

How do you assess the December climate summit in Lima? Media say the COP20 was more of a success – even though a moderate one.

During the Polish Presidency, at the COP19 summit in Warsaw, we have identified a timetable to reach a global agreement. Peruvians put a lot of effort into the negotiations and that should be recognised. But the main achievement of Lima meaning the “Lima call for climate action” document, is no breakthrough.

Italian MEP Giovanni La Via described the agreement as “the lowest common denominator”. Do you agree?

That is characteristic for all summits - to reach a consensus the expectations of many sides need to be met. In the European Union there are as much as 28 countries representing different interests that have to be settled.

On the global level, with 196 countries, finding a compromise is even harder, especially when global interests are so much more diversified. Let’s compare for example Bangladesh and the United States, which have completely different climate zones, levels of wealth as well as exposure to the effects of climate change.

So the summit results were blurred by national divergences?

But it upheld some crucial decisions that can help to lead to a real agreement on the COP21 in Paris next year.

First of all, national climate declarations were introduced - Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. They will be submitted by states parties of the future convention by the end of March 2015. They will be described in detail to discern the extent to which we are able to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, 2030 and beyond.

Such a long perspective?

Yes, because every country has to provide its own compartments - by when and to what extent it can and plans to reduce emissions.

And it will include all countries since there will be no division anymore between developing countries and so-called Annex 1 countries like the European Union...

This is one of the most important changes in the approach to a global strategy for combating climate change. Previously only developed countries were listed in Annex 1, and thus were to take on reduction commitments and the financial contribution to the program for the developing countries and to the fund for the state vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.

Moreover, Annex 1 gave a frozen picture of the countries situation in 1998. Some countries that were not listed in Annex 1 have currently a contribution per capital comparable to those in Europe, making the list obsolete. A more dynamic approach must be followed.

But this division still exists – there will still be a developed and a developing world in terms of the level of economic development ...

That is true. However, it has been agreed that the developing countries should not avoid obligations. Moreover, the agreement is built similarly to the agreement which was developed at EU level at the October European Council summit.

In Europe we have established a common goal - the reduction of emissions at the total level of 40 percent by 2030, but the level of emission reduction at the level of individual countries will depend on their individual capabilities.

In addition, some countries - including Poland - will receive assistance in the form of free emissions permits. Also special funds will be created to support the transformation of the energy mix to the one with lower emission, e.g. by supporting renewable energy.

In the same way we build today a global agreement – we have a common goal: to save the climate and prevent an increase of average global temperature above 2° C compared to the pre-industrial era. However, each state will have individual privileges and obligations.

Why is eliminating the distinction between developed and developing countries so important?

Because non-Annex 1 countries had no obligation so far. On the contrary, they were waiting for help, e.g. from the Adaptation...
Fund. So the idea was to make China, India, Indonesia and other similar countries - rapidly developing and exploiting the nature - to contribute.

Today we all must make an effort, depending on our abilities. And it has to be a real effort - a real reduction in emissions, not business as usual.

And what about the poorest countries that are only beginning to emit greenhouse gases?

There are not many such countries. They do not have any big impact on global emissions, and are even not able to calculate it – and that is why the calculation will be carried out by other countries. These countries are also not yet organised enough to plan anything. All other must present their climate strategies.

Countries that will report precise plans to reduce emissions can expect assistance from the Green Climate Fund, Loss and Damage Mechanism or technological flow.

What are the predictions with respect to the planned reduction?

Poland must reduce emissions by 40 percent - like the entire Union, which, will present its declarations collectively, not as 28 separate countries one by one.

If you have a look at the US offer to reduce emissions by 16 percent, and China to continue to emit even more and peak somewhere between 2020 and 2030, it means that for more than a dozen years major emitters will actually increase emissions. Most countries outside the EU will take a much more modest contribution.

Reduction plans will be submitted by the end of March 2015. According to many commentators, however, they will not be enough to prevent temperatures from rising above 2 °C...

Unfortunately, I agree with this opinion.

And what will happen if the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) considers that the declared cuts are insufficient?

Declarations should clearly go beyond business as usual, and should also contain an adequate description and justification – a proof that real changes are planned. And if it is not enough by the time of the Paris conference, the IPCC will indicate the necessary level of global contribution.

So the IPCC will determine whether this is enough based on national declarations. How can we be sure that countries will sign if the IPCC deems the cuts insufficient?

It is difficult to predict it today. But the bottom-up approach - proposed by Poland at the climate conference in Durban – takes into account declarations and the situation of the states parties in the formulation of the final objectives. It is also the so-called principle of the so-called common but differentiated responsibility, used also in the European Union. Earlier attempts to impose top-down reduction targets have failed - in Copenhagen they were all rejected. And hence the idea of bottom-up implementation of solutions.

Let’s assume the Convention is signed. This is not a guarantee that things will change, because it will not be legally binding - correct?

We were also discussing in Lima on this point. The parties agreed that the convention will be legally binding, although this may not be enough.

International law does not guarantee any types of pressure, so the only one - but important - tool is a possibility of withdrawal of the assistance. In addition to the sense of responsibility, motivating factors should also be solidarity and international pressure, because all the commitments will be published online and will be visible for the whole world to see.

So how do you generally evaluate the results of the conference in Lima?

There was no breakthrough. We do not know what the contributions from individual countries will contain and whether they will be comparable to each other. We must continue to work hard to be able to sign an agreement in Paris.

It will not be easy as 200 countries need to co-sign it. But we will do our best to reach agreement on the COP21. I hope we will succeed and I am glad for the fact that Poland’s effort in the climate negotiations is recognised. Surely we owe this to experience we have gained in the previous round of negotiations.

Nothing guarantees today the signing of a contract for the benefit of the global climate. We are still far from success, but Lima put us closer to this success.

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