

Indicative list of projects and existing energy infrastructures potentially affected, depending on application of sanctions in case of the adoption of the US bill in its current form¹

| Name | Type | EU interest | Russian interest | Capacity | Potentially impacted? |
|------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| Baltic Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) | Prospective gas plant project on the Gulf of Finland of the Baltic Sea | Shell (stakes to be defined under 50%) | Gazprom (at least 50%) | 10 million tonnes of LNG per year (approx. 13.6 billion cubic metres per year). | Could be impacted under Section 232 (b):. Pipeline inside Russia to the LNG export terminal could be covered. |
| Blue Stream | Gas export pipeline from Russia to Turkey | ENI 50% | Gazprom 50% | 16 billion cubic metres per year. | Could be impacted under Section 232(c) (maintenance, repair of sections of pipe on Russian land or Russian waters). |
| CPC Pipeline | Oil export pipeline with Russia's participation together with EU companies (carrying Kazakh oil via Russian territory to the Black Sea) | BG Overseas Holdings (Shell) 2%, ENI 2% | Russian Federation 19%, Rosneft-Shell Caspian Ventures Limited 7,5% | 1.3 million barrels per day (expected capacity in 2017). | - Expansion of the pipeline could be impacted under Section 232(b) which states "ability of Russian federation to construct energy export pipelines" – even if the oil is not Russian. - Existing pipeline could also be impacted under Section 232(c) (maintenance, repair of sections of pipe on Russian land or Russian waters). |
| Nord Stream 1 | Existing gas export pipeline | Wintershall 15.5% Engie 9%, Gasunie 9% | Gazprom 51% | 55 billion cubic metres per year. | Could be impacted under Section 232(c) (maintenance, |

¹ This information is based on public sources and on possible wide interpretation of the restrictive measures relating to Russian energy sector currently under discussion in the US Congress.

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| | | | | | repair of sections of pipe on Russian land or Russian waters). |
| Nord Stream 2 | Prospective gas export pipeline | Financing by ENGIE, Shell, OMV, Uniper, Wintershall (providing appr. half of project budget of EUR 9.5 billion) | Gazprom 100% | 55 billion cubic metres per year. | Could be impacted under Section 232(b) (construction of a new pipe on Russian land or Russian waters). |
| Sakhalin 2 expansion | Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) export facility expansion | Shell Sakhalin Holding (27.5%) | Gazprom 50% plus 1 share | 10.9 million tons of LNG per year (approx. 14.8 billion cubic metres per year). | Already falls under current US sanctions due to condensate in the Yuzhno-Kirinskoye field. |
| Shah Deniz and South Caucasus Pipeline | Azerbaijan's Gas field in the Caspian Sea (potentially including condensate) + export pipeline from Azerbaijan to Georgia (feeding into Southern Gas Corridor) | Shah Deniz 2 field operated by BP which has a share of 28.8% | Lukoil 10% | 10 billion cubic metres per year contracted by EU companies in 2013. | Shah Deniz 2 field should fall outside scope of Section 223 due to 33% threshold. Southern Caucasus gas pipeline expansion should not be covered if Section 232(c) is deemed only to refer to Russian territory. |
| Zhor Field | Offshore gas field in Egypt currently under development | ENI 60%, BP 10% | Rosneft 30% | Estimated 850 billion cubic metres in place. | Dry gas field, so should not be covered by proposed sanctions, unless condensate discovered. Also should fall outside scope of Section 223 due to 33% threshold. |

In addition, any activity by a European hydrocarbons company or service company to maintain, repair, expand pipelines in the Russian Federation (territory plus Russian waters?) could be caught by Section 232. Eg: BP, in its activities with Rosneft, would not be able to engage in these activities, probably also including financial support